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INSURANCE AND CLIMATE CHANGE
JOSEPH MACDOUGALD AND PETER KOCHENBURGER 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change started as a scientific theory, became the
subject of environmental policy and international negotiation, and
today manifests itself within the courts in a series of boundary
testing cases that challenge the settled concepts of risk and
redress available under both environmental and insurance law. As
our climate becomes increasingly unstable and the causal link
between damage from sea-level rise and severe weather events
becomes ever more tangible and traceable, courts at all levels
wrestle with varying avenues of legal authority, including the
limitations of legal redress through the political question
doctrine, 2 the appropriateness of traditional federal and state
nuisance law, 3 and the viability of addressing climate change
through the established environmental statutory apparatus, such
as the Clean Air Act (CAA), which had primarily regulated only
traditional air pollution. 4 By 2014, the first wave of climate law
cases reached resolution. Yet, through (or perhaps despite) this
process, clarity is emerging as it relates to an insured’s liability for
past emissions and insurer’s obligations.
This paper will synthesize the developing field of climate law
with the insurance industry’s practice and policy. 5 The first part of
1. Joseph MacDougald is a Professor in Residence and Executive Director
for the Center for Energy & Environmental Law, University of Connecticut
School of Law. Peter Kochenburger is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law
and Executive Director of the Insurance Law Center at UConn Law School.
They thank the Center for Energy & Environmental Law’s research assistant,
Amanda Bellmar, and Insurance Law Librarian Yan Hong for their help.
2. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 879-80 (5th Cir. 2009)
(reversing a lower court’s decision that Comer’s climate-based claims were
non-justiciable under the political question doctrine).
3. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (holding
that federal nuisance law was displaced in favor of the Environmental Protection
Agencies’ (EPA’s) regulation of greenhouse gases (GHGs) under the CAA).
4. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 22, Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (No. 05-1120) (quoting
Justice Scalia: “But I always thought an air pollutant was something different
from a stratospheric pollutant, and your claim here is not that the pollution of
what we normally call “air” is endangering health. That isn’t, that isn’t—your
assertion is that after the pollutant leaves the air and goes up into the
stratosphere it is contributing to global warming.”).
5. For a treatment of the future of climate change litigation, including the
procedural histories of the cases mentioned in this article, see generally
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this paper will discuss the evolving legal posture of climate
liability law by summarizing the long timescale of climate change’s
awareness; reviewing a selection of the leading climate liability
cases involving emitters, specifically Massachusetts v. EPA 6 and
the recent modifying case of Utility Air Group v. EPA; 7 Connecticut
v. American Electric Power; 8 Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil; 9 and finally assessing the impact of climate change
litigation on the insurer by presenting the Supreme Court of
Virginia case of AES v. Steadfast. 10
The second part of this paper examines the insurance
industry’s response to this evolving legal environment, drawing
from policy and the diverse public image presented by insurance
companies as they relate to this evolving risk category.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION
A. A Brief History of Climate Change Awareness and Emissions
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related.
For when carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere, it acts like
the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the
escape of reflected heat. It is therefore a species—the most
important species—of a “greenhouse gas.” 11

These words begin the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion, 12 the
Supreme Court’s most complete statement on the law’s response to
GHG emissions and their effect on Earth’s climate. Justice
Stevens’ opening recognizes a relationship that the scientific
community has long understood: that rising atmospheric carbon
dioxide (CO2) from anthropogenic sources could have a significant,
disruptive impact on our climate. Scientists began wrestling with
this fact almost 200 years before the Massachusetts decision.
In the 1820s Joseph Fourier was troubled by a simple
thermodynamic calculation—the earth’s warm temperature could
not be explained by the sun’s daily energy transferred to Earth
and the subsequent radiant heat loss back out to space. 13 The
explanation behind this observation remained a mystery until
decades later, when John Tyndall discovered that certain gases
Michael B. Gerrard & Joseph A. MacDougald, An Introduction to Climate
Change Liability and a View to the Future, 20 CONN. INS. L. J. 153 (2013)
(discussing emerging trends in climate change liability).
6. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
7. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
8. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
9. 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert denied 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
10. 283 Va. 609 (2012).
11. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 504.
12. Id.
13. SPENCER WEART, THE DISCOVERY OF GLOBAL WARMING 2-3 (2003).
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might be transparent to visible light, but relatively opaque (or
insulating) as to infrared radiation. 14 CO2 is one of the GHGs that
serve as a barrier or insulator to heat. Yet a full understanding of
the greenhouse effect would wait until just before the dawn of the
twentieth century, when Svante Arrhenius, a future Nobel
Laureate, would put the pieces together and correctly identify the
greenhouse effect. 15 Arrhenius explained the ice age by drops in
our atmosphere’s concentration of GHGs. 16 Looking into the
future, he hypothesized that the Industrial Revolution’s growing
CO2 emissions from smokestacks would one day warm the earth. 17
Arrhenius viewed this as potentially positive, discussing expanded
agriculture. 18
The predicted build-up of atmospheric GHGs only took on a
menacing characteristic with the multi-decade development of the
now famous “Keeling Curve.” Scientist Charles David Keeling
began periodically sampling the atmosphere from an observatory
on the big island of Hawaii in the 1950s. 19 His carefully controlled
sampling revealed the relentless upward staircase-climb of our
global atmosphere’s CO2 concentration. 20 Keeling’s work, which
began in the middle of the twentieth century, visually
demonstrates to policy makers that the expanding CO2concentration graph rose from 300 parts per million (ppm) to 350
ppm to over 400 ppm. 21

14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 5-7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 7. “Arrhenius, like nearly everyone at the end of the nineteenth
century, expected any technological change would be for the best.”
19. Id. at 35. “[Keeling] set [a CO2 measuring instrument] up atop the
volcanic peak Mauna Loa in Hawaii, surrounded by thousands of miles of clean
ocean, one of the best sites on Earth to measure the undisturbed atmosphere.”
20. See David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of
Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1771 (2007)
(discussing tort litigation re: climate change issues); see generally WEART, supra
note 12 (tracing the development of global warming scientific inquiry).
21. Justin Gillis, Heat-Trapping Gas Passes Milestone, Raising Fears, N.Y.
TIMES (May 10, 2013), available at www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/science
/earth/carbon-dioxide-level-passes-long-feared-milestone.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0 (stating, “‘It symbolizes that so far we have failed miserably in
tackling this problem,’ said Pieter P. Tans, who runs the monitoring program
at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration that reported the
new [400 ppm CO2 atmospheric concentration] reading”).
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Figure 1. The Keeling Curve: Daily Atmospheric CO2 22

As the phenomena of growing GHG concentrations gained
broader acceptance and study, attention turned toward potentially
catastrophic consequences of a warming globe. Over fifty-five years
ago, in Frank Capra’s film Unchained Goddess,23 which is quaint by
today’s standards, the narrator warned that CO2 emissions will
change our climate, melting the glaciers and causing sea levels to rise.
Moving from entertainment and theorizing to careful scientific
review, the United Nations (UN) Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) and other organizations have documented
the complex and various possible negative consequences of
anthropogenic, or man-made, climate change. 24 Such consequences
include sea level rise, more powerful storms, dislocated weather
patterns of excess snowfall and drought, and human issues such as
health effects and the creation of climate refugees. 25
22. SCRIPPS INSTITUTION OF OCEANOGRAPHY, http://keelingcurve.ucsd.edu
(last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
23. THE UNCHAINED GODDESS (Frank Capra Productions 1958).
24. See UN IPCC, Fifth Assessment, Summary for policy makers, www.ipcc
.ch/report/ar5/wg1/docs/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf for meteorological
effects. See UN IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to
Advance Climate Adaptation, Summary for Policy Makers 92012), p. 5 et seq.
for a discussion of the health effects and mitigation steps. www.ipcc.wg2.gov
/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-SPMbrochure_FINAL.pdf.
25. See Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC, 1, 2-10 (Thomas
F. Stocker et. al eds., 2013), available at www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/docs/WGIA
R5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf (highlighting certain meteorological effects of global
warming); see also UN IPCC, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and
Disasters to Advance Climate Adaptation, Summary for Policy Makers, 1, 5 et
seq. (2012), available at www.ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/images/uploads/SREX-SPMbro
chure_FINAL.pdf (discussing health effects and possible mitigation steps).
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The U.S. litigation system has found a basis to seek relief when
there is science defining a harm, a potentially harmed class of
victims, and a traceable cause. This has significant consequences for
the insured and insurers alike.
B. The Rise of Climate Liability and Insurance Litigation
Climate change litigation can arise in many contexts.
Though climate related litigation exists in other countries, more
climate change cases have been brought in the United States than
in the rest of the world combined, and the United States stands
alone in seeing significant litigation that seeks to hold greenhouse
gas (GHG) emitters liable for the harms caused by climate change. 26

Environmental groups frequently challenge governmental
action through the National Environmental Policy Act. 27 Opponents
to climate change policy have used the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and similar acts to require climatologists, academics, and
scientists, particularly those attached to state universities or federal
departments, to turn over emails and other information to public
scrutiny. 28 Similarly, environmental advocacy groups have sought
to compel the EPA to regulate on behalf of the Endangered Species
Act or the Clean Water Act. 29
Of particular relevance for this discussion is the line of cases
that, taken together, discuss the role of the CAA versus federal
nuisance law as a vehicle addressing climate change harm liability.
Three cases, spanning a time frame from 2007 until 2013, reveal the
Supreme Court’s view of how climate liability is to be assessed:
Massachusetts v. EPA, 30 (as modified by Utility Air Regulatory Group
26. Gerrard, supra note 5, at 153. Specifically, COLUMBIA LAW SCH.
CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE, http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change
/resources/non-us-climate-change-litigation-chart (last visited Mar. 28, 2014)
(providing multiple charts describing non-U.S. climate litigation). RICHARD
LORD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
27. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biodiversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
538 F.3d 1172, 1200 (stating, “NHTSA’s reasoning is arbitrary and capricious
for several reasons. First, while the record shows that there is a range of
values, the value of carbon emissions reduction is certainly not zero. NHTSA
conceded as much during oral argument when, in response to questioning,
counsel for NHTSA admitted that the range of values begins at $3 per ton
carbon. NHTSA insisted at argument that it placed no value on carbon
emissions reduction rather than zero value. We fail to see the difference.”).
28. See Cuccinelli v. Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 4210 (2012) (holding Virginia
attorney general’s Civil Investigative Demand for information was not
applicable to the university); see also Am. Trad. Inst. v. Univ. of Va., 130934
Va. 1 (2014) (employing FOIA in a companion case before the Virginia
Supreme Court).
29. Letter from the Center for Biological Diversity to the EPA (July 23,
2013), available at www.epa.gov/ogc/NOIdocuments/NoticeEPAWAOR303d20
13.pdf (providing an example of one attempt to compel the EPA to act).
30. See generally Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497.
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v. EPA in June 2014), Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 31 and
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil. 32 Of particular importance
here is the case whose final disposition is the most recent: Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil. The Kivalina case led to a dispute, ultimately resolved
by the Supreme Court of Virginia, between an insured and the
insurer regarding whether the harm alleged by the Inupiat tribe in
the Native Village of Kivalina was the type appropriately covered by
a Commercial General Liability (CGL) Policy. 33
1. Massachusetts v. EPA
Massachusetts v. EPA is the seminal case for climate law and
the CAA. Brought on behalf of several states and other interested
parties, the case sought to compel the EPA to regulate CO2 from
mobile sources as a pollutant within the meaning of the CAA. The
EPA argued that it did not have authority to regulate due to many
considerations, including the Bush Administration’s negotiations
with developing countries. 34
Justice Stevens noted in the opinion that “EPA does not
dispute the existence of a causal connection between man-made
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum,
therefore, EPA’s refusal to regulate such emissions ‘contributes’ to
Massachusetts’ injuries.” 35 These injuries included loss of shoreline.
EPA no doubt has significant latitude as to the manner, timing,
content, and coordination of its regulations with those of other
agencies. But once EPA has responded to a petition for rulemaking,
its reasons for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing
statute. Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid
taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do
not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do. 36

The Court ultimately endorsed the CAA as being responsive to
GHGs. 37 Subsequent to this ruling, the EPA made an
endangerment finding under the CAA; specifically the EPA found
that CO2 is a danger to the public health and welfare, making CO2 a
regulated pollutant under the CAA’s authority to regulate mobile
31. See generally Am. Elec. Power, 131 S. Ct. 2527.
32. See generally Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849.
33. This article will discuss the liability and insurance implications of these
cases. See generally Gerrard, supra note 5 (providing a more detailed case
summary as well as additional procedural insight).
34. See Gerrard, supra note 5, at 155 (stating “The Agency’s rationale was
based on several considerations, including, among others, the assertion that
since GHG emissions were the subject of international negotiations by the
Executive Branch, regulatory development by the EPA would disrupt these
delicate, international proceedings.”).
35. Mass v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 523.
36. Id. at 533.
37. Id.
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sources and, by extension, stationary sources. 38 While many other
cases involving climate claims had been dismissed under the
political question doctrine or on other grounds, indicating the courts
were choosing not to engage in the climate change debate,
Massachusetts v. EPA suggested that judicial rulings by the US
Supreme Court were possible.
In July 2014, the Supreme Court revisited and clarified the
Mass. v. EPA holding in the case of Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA. 39 In implementing the Mass v. EPA decision, the EPA
reasoned that if GHGs are “air pollutants” under the mobile
sources portion of the CAA, then the Court’s decision must
“trigger” an obligation to regulate GHGs under the stationary
sources portion of the CAA. 40 Trying to avoid massively expanding
the reach of CAA’s regulated base, the EPA issued a “tailoring
rule” to increase the limits of GHG emissions that would require
CAA compliance. 41
In a holding that was considered by many to be a vindication
of EPA’s regulatory approach, 42 the Court, in a 7-2 ruling, upheld
EPA’s regulation of GHGs from those sources whose control
technologies were already being regulated for other reasons under
the CAA, so-called “anyway sources,” but in a portion of the
decision that divided 5-4, the Court held that a stationary source
could not be regulated solely due to its GHG emissions. 43
38. See generally Patricia Ross McCubbin, EPA’s Endangerment Finding for
Greenhouse Gases and the Potential Duty to Adopt National Ambient Air Quality
Standards to Address Global Climate Change, 33 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437 (2009).
39. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 573
US __, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (hereinafter UARG).
40. Id. “EPA issued its ‘final decision’ regarding the prospect that motorvehicle greenhouse-gas standards would trigger stationary-source permitting
requirements ... .” (hereinafter Triggering Rule).
41. Id. “EPA announced that beginning on the effective date of its
greenhouse-gas standards for motor vehicles, stationary sources would be
subject to the PSD program and Title V on the basis of their potential to emit
greenhouse gases. ... EPA then announced steps it was taking to ‘tailor’ the
PSD program and Title V to greenhouse gases. ... Those steps were necessary,
it said, because the PSD program and Title V were designed to regulate ‘a
relatively small number of large industrial sources,’ and requiring permits for
all sources with greenhouse-gas emissions above the statutory thresholds
would radically expand those programs, making them both unadministrable
and ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that designed’ them.”
42. See Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Emissions Limits on Big Industry,
N.Y. Times, June 23, 2014. “In a big win for environmentalists, the Supreme
Court on Monday effectively endorsed the Obama administration’s efforts to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from sources like power plants, even as it
criticized what it called the administration’s overreaching.”
43. Id. at 2449. “We hold that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it
interpreted the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for
stationary sources based on their greenhouse-gas emissions. Specifically, the
Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for purposes of defining
a ‘major emitting facility’ (or a ‘modification’ thereof) in the PSD context or a
‘major source’ in the Title V context. To the extent its regulations purport to do
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Having dispatched this fundamental challenge to the Mass v.
EPA rationale, the Court confirmed that the CAA exists as a primary
vehicle to address climate change. However, at the time of the Mass
ruling, several questions remained unanswered as to whether or not
the CAA was the exclusive path at law to for the injured to seek
redress from or to change the behavior of GHG emitters.
2. Connecticut v. AEP
Following Massachusetts v. EPA, the collection of states
comprising the plaintiffs in Connecticut v. AEP argued that while as
a statutory scheme, the CAA may exist to address GHGs, principles
of federal nuisance law could allow a collection of states to seek
injunctive relief against the emitters. The states that brought the
action believed that while EPA may have the ability to regulate
under the CAA and issue an endangerment finding, that until EPA
actually regulates, the injunctive power of federal common law
nuisance was still available to them. 44 The Court, having just
supported the CAA as their regulatory vehicle for addressing GHG
emissions, was not eager to open up an entire new enforcement
regime in the judiciary through federal nuisance law. “The plaintiffs
argue, as the Second Circuit held, that federal common law is not
displaced until EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority, i.e.,
until it sets standards governing emissions from the defendants’
plants. We disagree.” 45 Noting that Congress created the CAA with
a purposeful and deliberative decision-making path before
regulating a pollutant, the unanimous Court held:
Indeed, this prescribed order of decision making—the first decider
under the Act is the expert administrative agency, the second,
federal judges—is yet another reason to resist setting emissions
standards by judicial decree under federal tort law. The appropriate
amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-producing
sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum: as with other questions of
national or international policy, informed assessment of competing
interests is required. Along with the environmental benefit
potentially achievable, our Nation’s energy needs and the possibility
of economic disruption must weigh in the balance. 46

This 2011 decision dismissing the complaint held that the
regulation of GHGs was in the hands of the EPA, reinforcing
so, they are invalid. EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as
a ‘pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter’ for purposes of requiring
BACT for ‘anyway’ sources. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
in part and reversed in part.”
44. See Gerrard, supra note 5, at 159. “As Connecticut had been the only
GHG nuisance law case to be decided by the Supreme Court, and in that case
plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, the Kivalina plaintiffs hoped their case
was distinguishable since it claimed money damages instead.”
45. Conn. v. AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
46. Id. at 2539.
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Massachusetts v. EPA. 47
3. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation
Kivalina is an Alaskan village occupying some four square
miles on the tip of a barrier island and is largely populated by the
federally recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans.
Kivalina’s survival has been threatened by erosion resulting from
wave action and sea storms for several decades . . . The villagers of
Kivalina depend on the sea ice that forms on their coastline in the
fall, winter, and spring each year to shield them from powerful
coastal storms. But in recent years, the sea ice has formed later in
the year, attached later than usual, broken up earlier than expected,
and has been thinner and less extensive in nature. As a result,
Kivalina has been heavily impacted by storm waves and surges that
are destroying the land where it sits. Massive erosion and the
possibility of future storms threaten buildings and critical
infrastructure in the city with imminent devastation. If the village
is not relocated, it may soon cease to exist. [In its lawsuit], Kivalina
attributes the impending destruction of its land to the effects of
global warming, which it alleges results in part from emissions of
large quantities of greenhouse gases by the Energy Producers. 48

Kivalina sued numerous emitters of GHGs including the AES
Corporation, an owner-operator of many energy businesses
including power generation from coal-fired power plants. 49 The
lawsuit asked for monetary damages to relocate the native
population. The Army Corps of Engineers had recommended
evacuation and indicated the expense would be substantial. 50
Unlike in Connecticut, where the plaintiff state sought injunctive
relief, the Kivalina plaintiffs sought only monetary damages. “As
Connecticut had been the only GHG nuisance law case to be
decided by the Supreme Court, and in that case plaintiffs sought
only injunctive relief, the Kivalina plaintiffs hoped their case was
distinguishable since it claimed money damages instead.” 51 The
Ninth Circuit, however, dismissed the case on the grounds that,
“the Supreme Court has held that federal common law addressing

47. Id.
48. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobile Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 2012).
49. See AES Annual Report, 1, 14 (2012), available at http://investor.aes. com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=76149&p=irol-reportsAnnualArchive#2012
(stating,
“We
currently own and/or operate a generation portfolio of approximately 31,000 MW,
excluding the generation capabilities of our integrated utilities. Our generation
fleet is diversified by fuel type. As a percentage of installed capacity, coal and
natural gas each account for 36% and 35%, respectively, of our generating
capacity. Renewables, primarily hydro, wind and solar, represent 25% of our
generating capacity and oil, diesel and petroleum coke comprise the rest.”).
50. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Alaska Vill. Erosion Tech. Assistance Program,
1, 4-5, 23 (2006), www.housemajority.org/coms/cli/AVETA_Report.pdf.
51. Gerrard, supra note 5, at 159 (citations omitted).
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domestic greenhouse gas emissions has been displaced by
Congressional action. That determination displaces federal
common law public nuisance actions seeking damages, as well as
those actions seeking injunctive relief.” 52 The Supreme Court
denied certiorari in May 2013. 53
Combined, these three cases demonstrate the Court’s clear
direction that the liability and regulation of GHGs is directed
through the CAA, displacing federal common law claims.
C. AES v. Steadfast—First Impressions of Climate Law and
Liability Insurance
While the questions of ultimate liability and regulation were
being resolved in the federal courts, another climate case was making
its way through the Virginia state court system. As discussed supra,
the Kivalina plaintiffs had sought recovery from the AES Corporation
as one of the energy providers. When sued, AES notified Steadfast
Insurance Company, who had provided CGL insurance for several
years during the period Kivalina was alleging that AES harmed them
through GHG emissions. Steadfast filed a declaratory judgment
action, stating that it did not owe a defense to AES for three reasons:
(1) the Complaint did not allege “property damage” caused by an
“occurrence,” which was necessary for there to be coverage under the
policies; (2) any alleged injury arose prior to the inception of
Steadfast’s coverage; and (3) the claims alleged in the Complaint fell
within the scope of the pollution exclusion stated in AES’s policies. 54

The Supreme Court of Virginia applied its traditional “eight
corners rule” to determine whether Steadfast had a duty to defend
AES in the Kivalina litigation. The court stated:
Both AES and Steadfast agree that it is a well-established principle,
consistently applied in this Commonwealth, that only the
allegations in the complaint and the provisions of the insurance
policy are to be considered in deciding whether there is a duty on
the part of the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured. This
principle is commonly known as the “eight corners rule” because the
determination is made by comparing the “four corners” of the
underlying complaint with the “four corners” of the policy, to
determine whether the allegations in the underlying complaint
come within the coverage provided by the policy. 55

Steadfast asserted three coverage defenses, though the
Virginia Supreme Court focused on only one, whether the
consequences of emitting GHGs were an “occurrence” under the
52. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
53. See UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, ORDER LIST: 569 U.S. 1 (2013),
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/052013zor_m6io.pdf
(denying
certiorari without the participation of Justice Alito).
54. AES v. Steadfast Ins. Corp., 725 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Va. 2012).
55. Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
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policies. For coverage to be triggered, the occurrence could not
have been a foreseeable consequence of GHG emissions, but
instead an accident or unintended consequence. In their analysis
of the policies, the Virginia Supreme Court stated:
[t]he relevant policies provide coverage for damage resulting from
an “occurrence,” and define an occurrence as “an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful condition.” The terms “occurrence” and “accident” are
“synonymous and . . . refer to an incident that was unexpected from
the viewpoint of the insured.” [The Virginia Supreme Court had
previously] held that an “accident” is commonly understood to mean
“an event which creates an effect which is not the natural or
probable consequence of the means employed and is not intended,
designed, or reasonably anticipated.” An accidental injury is one
that “happen[s] by chance, or unexpectedly; taking place not
according to the usual course of things; casual; fortuitous.” 56

The Virginia court noted that when the action was intentional
but the consequences were accidental then, “the dispositive issue
in determining whether an accidental injury occurred is not
whether the action undertaken by the insured was intended, but
rather whether the resulting harm is alleged to have been
reasonably anticipated or the natural or probable consequence of
the insured’s intentional act.” 57 Thus, insurance coverage turned
on one question: could the climate change consequences of GHG
emissions have been reasonably anticipated by AES?
To solve this problem, the Virginia court did not need to look
at the long history of climate change science, although Kivalina
brought its lawsuit against the backdrop of the scientific
background mentioned at the beginning of this article. Instead,
adhering to its “eight corners” analysis, the Virginia Supreme
Court noted that the entire Kivalina allegation was for intentional
harm, and AES knew or should have known of the consequences of
its emissions. Specifically:
Where the harmful consequences of an act are alleged to have been
not just possible, but the natural or probable consequences of an
intentional act, choosing to perform the act deliberately, even if in
ignorance of that fact, does not make the resulting injury an
“accident” even when the complaint alleges that such action was
negligent. ... Even if AES were actually ignorant of the effect of its
actions and/or did not intend for such damages to occur, Kivalina
alleges its damages were the natural and probable consequence of
AES’s intentional actions. Therefore, Kivalina does not allege that
its property damage was the result of a fortuitous event or accident,
and such loss is not covered under the relevant CGL policies. 58

AES v. Steadfast is the only state supreme court decision
56. Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
57. Id. (citations omitted, emphasis from the original).
58. Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
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directly applying climate change claims to a liability policy. 59
However, it may have little precedential power. The decision is
based on a constricted view of “occurrence” and “accident” that, as
the concurrence notes, could eliminate coverage for garden-variety
negligence claims 60 and may not be adopted by other courts
considering climate change liability. Perhaps more important, the
court did not need to evaluate the pollution exclusions in the
policies, which could provide firmer and more widely accepted
grounds for excluding such claims. 61 Finally, liability insurers can
also modify their policy language to specifically exclude liability
against policyholders arising from climate change claims, though
state insurance regulators typically have the authority to review new
policy forms and endorsements and perhaps to exclude their use.
For now, some questions appear answered in the evolving field
of climate law. Now thrice-reinforced, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that Congress intended CAA’s statutory scheme to be the
legal source to address climate change. Barring congressional
action, emitters are unlikely to be subject to liability or injunctive
relief under federal law outside CAA. However, other regulatory
approaches are being constantly urged upon the judiciary and the
EPA through CAA, the Endangered Species Act, and others. None of
these alternatives have faced any substantial court challenge.
Climate change is complex. There are many effects, some of
which could lead to claims that are viable under state law.
Kivalina was concerned with sea level rise, 62 but what of claims
for drought, shellfish population decimation, or enhanced storms?
These scientific areas may not have been as predictable several
years ago, a fact that could affect both liability for damages and
the applicability of insurance coverage for such claims. Our
weather systems are complex and so are the unintended and
unforeseen consequences of changing a planet’s climate. New
information appears to emerge almost daily.
III. INSURERS & CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Why Insurers Are Involved
Insurance companies are engaged with climate change as
59. AES, 725 S.E.2d at 532.
60. Id. at 538-539. Interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of
state law and there can be significant variation in how state courts address
similar insurance policy language. Id.
61. Steadfast’s appeal brief cites this pollution exclusion: “[this policy does
not apply to damages] arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened
discharge, dispersal, release or escape of ‘pollutants.’” “Pollutants” are “any
solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” (record citations
deleted). The AES Corporation, Appellant, v. Steadfast Insurance Company,
Appellee, 2010 WL 6893536 (Va.), 5-6.
62. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 849.
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corporate actors, as investors, and as insurers of risks. Insurers
own and rent large amounts of real estate, and for those operating
nationally and internationally, branches throughout the country
and world. As landlords and tenants, insurers are subject to most
types of weather and climate related risks, including hurricanes,
earthquakes, tornadoes, blizzards, hail, and of course floods. The
industry employs millions, purchases and consumes energy, and
holds itself out as a “green” actor. 63 Whether organized as a stock
company or a mutual owned (theoretically) by its policyholders,
insurers are corporations also responsible to their stockholders,
policyholders, reinsurers, private rating agencies, as well as
government regulators in every jurisdiction they do business in.
Insurers collect vast sums of money from premiums that must be
reserved and conservatively invested so that the promise of
insurance, paying claims lawfully owed, is upheld even when those
claims come due years and sometimes many decades after the
policy was issued. Insurers are major investors in government
bonds, stocks and real estate generally 64 and this role provides
both opportunities to influence development to adapt to climate
change, as well as financial risks for failing to do so.
However, it is insurers’ business in underwriting risks that
places them in a different role than most other corporate actors.
Companies insure commercial and residential properties near
oceans and rivers, on earthquake fault lines, and in areas subject
to all forms of weather-related risks. 65 While property insurance
may pose the greatest underwriting risk, liability insurance, life
and health insurance and workers’ compensation can also be
affected by climate change. Insurers utilize historical loss patterns
and weather modeling to help set rates (premiums). 66 Climate
change challenges these calculations by both increasing the
number and severity of weather-related losses and by adding
considerable uncertainty as to where and how these losses will
develop. Insurers theoretically have the tools to manage some of
this uncertainty, but scientific, regulatory and market constraints
also limit their abilities to do so.
The insurance industry’s economic interests and capabilities
63. See, e.g., websites for Allstate, USAA, and The Hartford, infra notes 55-63.
64. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, A Firm Foundation: How
Insurance Support the Economy, available at www2.iii.org/firm-foundation/intro
duction/to-the-reader.html (describing that in 2012 the insurance industry held
$7 trillion in invested assets and cash; the majority of investments was held in
bonds, with government-related bonds the majority of the bond portfolio).
65. However, not all potentially catastrophic events are natural. Chemical,
nuclear and biological hazards are risks that are not necessarily insurable,
and insuring against acts of terrorism has required a government role to
maintain a private insurance market. See, e.g., Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–160, 121 Stat 1839.
66. See, e.g., CHRISTINA M. CARROLL ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INSURANCE, 135-37 (2012).
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can enable it to contribute to climate change adaption in several
important ways. First, as well-funded private actors, insurers can
participate in research on mitigation strategies (e.g., hurricaneresistant buildings), 67 educate their policyholders and the public
generally, and as part of their extensive lobbying activities,
advocate at the state, federal and international levels public for
adaption policies such as up-to-date building codes and
environmental and zoning laws limiting building in particularly
sensitive areas. Insurers do this now, though with significant
variations in how they present to the public. 68
As underwriters, insurers assess, categorize and price risk for
policyholders. Their decisions on whether to insure, and if so at
what price and with what limitations, provide powerful economic
incentives for policyholders to modify their actions in socially
desirable ways. 69 For example, a property insurer might increase
or decrease a premium based on the building design and materials
used to construct it (e.g., if it incorporate the latest in hurricane
and wind-resistant roofing, windows and doors), its proximity to
flood waters, and the existence and sophistication of its emergency
management and business interruption planning. 70 Or, an insurer
might refuse to insure a structure altogether, because of its
location, inadequate construction, or repeated loss history. In some
instances, the private market’s refusal to insure specific risks or
industries can mean the creation of a government-sponsored
insurance program, such as a state windstorm program 71 or the
federal National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 72
67. See, e.g., THE INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR BUSINESS AND HOME SAFETY,
www.disastersafety.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2014).
68. See infra Section II C (discussing such variations).
69. See, e.g., Tom Baker and Rick Swedloff, Regulation by Liability Insurance:
From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1412, 1416-27
(2013) (explaining there is a large volume of literature from multiple disciplines on
the role of insurance as a “private regulator”); RICHARD V. ERICSON, AARON DOYLE
& DEAN BARRY, INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE, Ch. 2 (2003).
70. Standard commercial property insurance covers “business interruption”
losses as well as the costs of repairing or replacing physical structures.
Business interruption insurance covers continuing expenses that must be paid
despite the temporary cessation of business, as well as net profit. This
coverage can be the largest source of insurer claim payments when the
physical damage is largely to commercial rather than residential structures.
See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE, supra note 59, at 137.
71. See, e.g., CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, www.citizens
fla.com/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (indicating that Florida’s
Citizens Property Insurance Corp. serves as a residual market for a large
number of residential properties).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4001, et. seq. (2012). The NFIP is within the Department of
Homeland Security and under the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Government-sponsored insurance programs may serve as the
primary insurer of a specific risk (e.g., flood coverage for residential and small
business properties), or as a supplement or reinsurer to the private insurance
market (e.g., the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 41). Id.
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B. Insurance and Public Policy
Insurers’ flexibility is limited not only by competitive pressures
and scientific uncertainty, but also by operating in a complex
regulatory environment that can inhibit their ability to utilize riskbased pricing with insureds who are susceptible to weather events
and the effects of climate change. States, rather than the federal
government, regulate most areas of property, casualty, and life
insurance. 73 Individual states have great latitude in regulating
insurance rates, the types and forms of coverage, and insurers’
relationships with their policyholders, including limitations on
canceling or non-renewing policies. 74 Insurance is also not only a
desirable product for property owners; it is often a prerequisite, as
lenders require property insurance on mortgaged properties
throughout the loan period. 75 Public and political pressure may
cause insurance regulators to limit rates where insurance is
required, such as in homeowners, auto, and workers’ compensation
lines. 76 Catastrophic events often bring these pressures to the
forefront, as happened after Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy
(2012), with political and regulatory struggles as insurers attempted
73. While the federal government has had clear constitutional authority to
regulate insurance since 1944 (See U.S. v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
533, 552-53 (1944) (defining insurance as interstate commerce), it has
specifically declined to exercise this authority in most areas of insurance. See
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012) (stating in the preamble of the 1945 McCarranFerguson Act that state insurance regulation “is in the public interest”). The
U.S. is one of the few nations in the world with a mature insurance market
that regulates insurance primarily at the regional rather than federal level.
This regulatory structure (or lack thereof) creates both challenges and
opportunities for insurers in addressing climate change issues. See, e.g.,
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION,
226-27, 656-61 (Edward Elger, 2011); Chapter 10; Susan Randall, Insurance
Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the national
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLORIDA ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1999).
74. The degree of rate and form regulation varies by state, though personal
lines insurance (homeowner and auto) is more regulated than commercial
lines, including commercial property. See supra note 61.
75. In addition to insuring property, insurance acts a gatekeeper for
individuals and companies desiring to engage in a variety of activities,
including driving, operating a business (workers’ compensation and now
health insurance), engaging in certain professions (states often require
liability insurance for doctors, lawyers, insurance agents, and other
occupations), thus its description or term as a “private regulator.”
76. G.A.O., National Disasters: Public Policy Options for Changing the
Federal Role in Natural Catastrophe Insurance, 11-14 (GAO-08-07, Nov. 2007).
Rate regulation—or “suppression”—is not necessarily inappropriate, as the
decisions on insurance access and affordability can determine who can own
property and where, who can drive, or who can provide for their family in the
event of death or disability. Regulating rates and risk classifications allows
government the option of subsidizing premiums to the benefit of one risk class,
and possible detriment to others, and to determine what risks should be borne
by society as a whole. These are or should be political (public policy) decisions
and not determined solely by market forces.
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to raise rates and limit exposure to hurricane-prone properties and
property owners fighting to keep insurance affordable.
Regardless of the wisdom of regulating the rates and terms of
an insurance contract, doing so often limits or eliminates the
benefits of risk-based pricing. If insurers cannot charge an
actuarially accurate premium for a home located on the Gulf
Coast, or the New Jersey shore, then the policyholder is not
bearing the full insurance cost of the risk. 77 This allows the
policyholder to make decisions, such as where to locate property
and which costs are partially paid for by others, 78 and can
encourage more development in risk-prone areas than a full riskbased premium would. The political and legal debate surrounding
the 2012 amendments to the federal NFIP 79 that attempted to
eliminate subsidized rates for residences and small businesses,
and the March 2014 legislation that partially repealed them, 80
demonstrates the challenges of allowing risk-based premiums to
fully operate. 81 The cost of insurance can be a powerful incentive
in directing private economic decisions that can aid in climate
change adaptation and mitigation, such as how and where to
build. Legal restrictions on insurance rates may reflect an explicit
public policy determination to spread certain risks, but also should
be viewed as an obstacle to utilizing insurance as a private
regulatory tool to mitigate some of the effects of climate change.
C. Climate Change and Insurers’ Public Face
Insurers have ample reason to closely follow climate change
science and predictions for increased flooding, storms and other
weather-related events. However, how individual insurers publicly
communicate their awareness of climate change varies greatly.
77. HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER AND ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH
THE WEATHER, 25-27 (2009). An “actuarially accurate premium” is itself an area of
dispute between insurers and policyholders, with regulators authorized in many
states to determine the appropriate rate (subject to appeal to the courts). The
growing complexity and sophistication of risk modeling poses major challenges for
regulators who may not have full access to the models or the technical staff to
evaluate them. This topic needs greater attention, but not in this paper.
78. Id. And, since insurers spread risk and losses over the long term rather
than absorbing them, other policyholders rather than the insurance industry
subsidize these property owners.
79. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
Div. F, Title II, Subtitle A, § 100201, 126 Stat. 916 (2012).
80. See note [112], infra.
81. A subsidized NFIP is not by definition a bad choice, if our public policy
is to spread the risk of flood loss throughout the country, including taxpayers
who have no realistic flood exposure. We have made similar choices in other
areas, such as the federal terrorism reinsurance program or in the Affordable
Care Act, by eliminating health insurers’ ability to utilize pre-existing
conditions in rate-setting, thereby subsidizing individuals with expensive
medical conditions. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, supra note 41; Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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These differences may reflect a company’s estimation of how climate
change may alter its business, or a company’s perception of how its
policyholders and potential policyholders consider the issue.
The authors have reviewed the websites of various property
casualty insurers over a one-year period, selecting the largest
personal lines carriers in the U.S. as well as several insurers who
have major commercial lines operations, including commercial
property. 82 As a comparison, four large reinsurers, three in Europe
and one in the U.S., were also examined. 83 This is not intended as
comprehensive study, which could include more insurers, other
regions (and languages) reviewing websites over a multi-year
period, and examining other documents that insurers produce as
part of their “public face.” 84
There are significant differences in how these companies
present their public positions on climate change among insurers in
the U.S., as well as overall differences between U.S. companies
and European reinsurers. Figures 2-6 provide examples of the
search results for five companies. 85
Figure 2. Swiss Re 86

“Managing climate and natural disaster risk:
Re/insurance plays an important role in managing climate and
natural disaster risk, and that's why it's part of Swiss Re’s core
business.”

82. Included: Allstate, American Family, CNA, Farmers, GEICO, The Hartford,
Liberty Mutual, Nationwide, Progressive, Travelers, State Farm and USAA.
83. Swiss Re, Hannover Re, Munich Re, and Gen Re (a Berkshire
Hathaway company based in New York).
84. Though a company’s website and the issues it decides to emphasize on
it are likely to be the best example of its public messaging outside of direct
insurance product marketing, some U.S. insurers with minimal web-based
discussion of climate change do report on the issue in their annual reports
filed with regulators.
85. “Climate change” was the initial search term used on every insurer
website. If no results came up additional search terms, such as “global warming,”
were used. On all sites, various company pages were also reviewed such as “about
us,” corporate governance, and social and environmental responsibility.
86. SWISS RE, www.swissre.com/rethinking/climate_and_natural_disaster_
risk (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
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Figure 3. Munich Re 87

Figure 4. State Farm 88
You Searched For
climate change

1 - 2 of 2 | Showing:
Tips for Avoiding Tractor-Trailer Accidents—Safety Learning
Center—State Farm
... truck driver can see you and knows your intention. Don't change
lanes abruptly. Any sudden motion in a truck driver's periphery ...
visual indicator of your intentions. Adjust driving speed to climate
conditions. Rain, snow, and high winds can make driving ...

Figure 5. Nationwide 89
Search Results for "climate change"
climate chan

Search

Search

1 - 1 of 1 results for climate change.
Disaster Preparedness | Read About Disaster
Management and ...
www.nationwide.com/catastrophe-center.jsp
87. MUNICH RE, www.munichre.com/en/group/focus/climate_change/default
.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
88. STATE FARM, https://sfesearch.statefarm.com/Gateway/QueryService.as
px?view=statefarmcomsppublished&query=climate change&original=climate
change (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
89. NATIONWIDE, www.nationwide.com/search/query.htm (last visited Apr.
4, 2014).
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Find how disaster preparedness may help keep you and your
family safe.
Nationwide's disaster management team is here to assist in
the case of an emergency.
Figure 6. Travelers 90 Climate & the Environment

Travelers is one of the largest providers of property casualty
insurance products in the United States. Our success is built upon
our ability to provide innovative insurance and risk protection
products and services tailored to our customers' needs. We are
continually monitoring, anticipating and reacting to changing
climate conditions across all of our operations.

European reinsurers utilize their websites as a forum for
climate change information far more than any U.S. insurer. The
thoroughness with which this material is discussed may indicate
that these companies believe that an extensive public dialogue on
climate change, including how they are addressing it, is a
marketing or promotional advantage, reflecting the view that
responsible insurers and reinsurers should confront climate
change and help their policyholders do so as well. 91
These insurers’ public acceptance of climate change contrasts
dramatically to the reticence of many major U.S. property-casualty
insurers to publicly address the issue. State Farm is the most
notable example. Figure 3 is the result of the most recent search
conducted on State Farm’s website; there is virtually no public
information provided on climate change or adaptation, nor have
repeated searches over the last year discovered any. 92 State Farm
is the largest personal lines property-casualty insurer in the
90. TRAVELERS, https://www.travelers.com/about-us/travelers-institute/tho
ught-leadership/climate-and-environment.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
91. This does not imply that insurers’ concern is a facade; as noted, insurers
have very good reasons to participate in the climate change debate and to
research and promote adaptation strategies. There is also some variation
among the three European reinsurers; Hannover Re provides extensive
information on various environmental initiatives, but does not prominently
reference “climate change”—at least not on their English language web pages.
HANNOVER RE, www.hannover-re.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
92. See State Farm, supra note 62.
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country, operates in most states, and has millions of policyholders
potentially exposed to climate change-related losses. 93
This is also true for other property casualty insurers in the U.S.,
including American Family, GEICO, Liberty Mutual, Nationwide and
USAA. In contrast, several large commercial lines insurers who also
have significant personal lines operations are more descriptive or
public about their views toward climate change, including The
Hartford and Travelers. These differences among U.S. insurers might
reflect a split between stock and mutual companies; American
Family, Nationwide and State Farm are mutual companies, whereas
The Hartford and Travelers are stock companies. There is still
significant doubt in the American public about climate change, so
mutual insurers might be more reluctant to publicly engage in the
debate. In contrast, stock companies are owned by sophisticated
investors more likely to believe in the reality of climate change and
perhaps expect insurers to address it directly. This is speculation
however and there are contrary examples. CNA is a large commercial
stock insurer with no personal lines operations, yet it has virtually no
information on climate change on its website. 94 Progressive is a
personal lines stock company and similarly has no climate change
information on its website. 95
That reinsurers have a significantly greater public (website)
focus on climate change than do property-casualty direct
insurers, 96 could suggest that the reinsurance industry is simply
more exposed and therefore more concerned over the potential
effects of climate change. Additionally, reinsurance has
historically been a global business. Swiss Re, Munich Re and
Hannover Re reinsure risks throughout the world that are
potentially subject to every weather pattern that climate change
could worsen. 97 However, large property-casualty insurers, at least
93. Based on 2012 data, State Farm was the largest homeowner insurer in
the U.S., with approximately 20.74% of the market, as well as the leading
property casualty insurer with 10.3% of the overall property casualty market,
based on direction written premiums. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE
FACT BOOK, 96, 15 (2014).
94. CNA, www.cna.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (searching “climate change”).
95. PROGRESSIVE, www.progressive.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
Progressive does reference climate change in describing a fuel-efficient
automobile initiative. PROGRESSIVE, http://search.progressive.com/search (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014) (searching “climate change”).
96. Eric Reguly, No Climate-change deniers to be found in the reinsurance
business, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 28, 2013, available at www.theglobeand
mail.com/report-on-business/rob-magazine/an-industry-that-has-woken-up-toclimate-change-no-deniers-at-global-resinsurance-giant/article15635331/?page
=all. We have not researched European insurers other than the three
reinsurers and Zurich Insurance Group.
97. Gen Re, a Berkshire Hathaway company based in Stamford, Conn., has
more information on climate change than most U.S. insurers but not as
prominently available on its website as Swiss Re and Munich Re. GEN RE,
www.genre.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) (searching “climate change”).
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in the U.S., have similar reasons to be concerned about climate
change and increased losses among its policyholders. The U.S.,
with its many thousands of miles of shoreline and rivers, much of
it densely populated and heavily insured, is always at risk for
enormous flood losses. 98 Various regions in the country are also
subject to hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, hail, blizzards,
drought, heat waves, deep freezes, forest fires, mudslides, and
other weather-related losses that could become both more common
and more destructive. Insurers are as much or more a stakeholder
in efforts to address climate change as any other industry. 99
A more accurate explanation may be that major U.S. property
casualty insurers are not ignoring climate change but see little
business advantage in publicizing their views and work in the field, as
public acceptance to even the existence of climate change remains
controversial in the U.S. Informal discussions with State Farm
representatives suggest this idea, as they noted that State Farm has
been tracking weather patterns for 125 years as part of its risk
modeling and continues to do so today, regardless of how it publicly
characterizes the reasons for changing weather patterns. This is a
more likely explanation than believing the country’s largest property
casualty insurer is simply ignoring climate change and the added risks
it presents to the company and its policyholders.100 Whether it applies
to other insurers, especially those with a regional rather than national
focus, is uncertain.
98. G.A.O., National Disasters: Public Policy Options for Changing the
Federal Role in Natural Catastrophe Insurance, 9 (GAO-08-07, Nov. 2007).
Hurricanes Andrew (1992) and Katrina (2005) and “Super Storm” Sandy
(2012) were the three largest natural disasters in the U.S. in terms of property
insurance payments—$24.3 billion, $47.4 billion, and $18.8 billion,
respectively. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Catastrophes: Insurance
Issues, www.iii.org/issues_updates/catastrophes-insurance-issues.html (last
visited Apr. 4, 2014). These figures, adjusted for 2012 dollars, do not include
flood claims paid by the NFIP. Id. The 2011 World Trade Center attacks
accounted for approximately $24.35 billion in property claims, and additional
insurance payments for life, health, liability and workers’ compensation
claims. THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, 140 (2014).
99. Recognizing this, the UN has a special initiative to recruit insurers as
allies in climate change adaption and mitigation. UNEP PRINCIPLES FOR
SUSTAINABLE INSURANCE, www.unepfi.org/psi (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
100. “Most insurers, including the reinsurance companies that bear much of the
ultimate risk in the industry, have little time for the arguments heard in some
right-wing circles that climate change isn’t happening, and are quite comfortable
with the scientific consensus that burning fossil fuels is the main culprit of global
warming.” Eduardo Porter, For Insurers, No Doubts on Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2013, available at www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/ins
urers-stray-from-the-conservative-line-on-climate-change.html?pagewanted=all.
Frank Nutter, longtime president of the Reinsurance Association of America, was
interviewed in this article: “[i]nsurance is heavily dependent on scientific thought
... It is not as amenable to politicized scientific thought ... the insurance industry’s
reluctance [to publicly address climate change] is born of hesitation to become
embroiled in controversies over energy policy.” Id.
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Zurich Insurance Group’s various websites strongly support
this thesis. Zurich, a Swiss-based insurer with a large U.S.
presence, is prominently engaged in climate change research and
advocacy. Its home page (English version) provides extensive webbased information on climate change, including its own “Climate
Initiative,” which studies the effects of climate change on
policyholders and insurers. 101 However, in contrast, there are no
climate change references on the website of its U.S. subsidiary,
Farmers Insurance. 102 Zurich made opposite decisions on how to
disclose and promote its involvement with climate change in Europe
and the U.S.—or at least related to their personal lines products. 103
U.S. opinion polls have generally demonstrated that,
compared to Europeans, the American public is more skeptical of
both the existence of climate change and the need to mitigate and
prepare for it. Acceptance of climate change by the American
public has varied from 52% to 72% between 2008 and 2012, as
evaluated by the Center for Local, State and Urban Policy at the
University of Michigan (Figure 7, infra). 104 Although belief in
climate change has increased to 67% from its low of 52% in spring
2010, it has not yet climbed back to its high of 72% in fall 2008.
Figure 7. Belief in Global Warming

This contrasts with polling results in the European Union
(EU). In 2011 an EU survey asked residents to identify “the
greatest problem facing the world.” 105 Climate change was second
out of eleven choices, with 20% of those surveyed ranked it the
101. ZURICH FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, The Climate Risk Challenge: the
Role of Insurance in Pricing Climate-Related Risks (2009), available at
www.zurich.com/aboutus/resourcecenter/pdfdownloads.
102. Since Farmers’ website does not have a search function, all likely webbased topic pages were reviewed, as was done for other insurer websites.
Farmers Insurance provides insurance primarily for individuals and small
businesses. FARMERS INSURANCE, www.farmers.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
103. Zurich also does commercial insurance business under its own name in
the U.S. and a “climate change” website search on its North American website
pulls up the same documents as it does on Zurich’s home page. ZURICH,
www.zurichna.com/zna/home/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
104. FORD SCHOOL CENTER FOR LOCAL, STATE, AND URBAN POLICY,
http://closup.umich.edu/issues-in-energy-and-environmental-policy/2/nseefindings-report-for-belief-related-questions/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
105. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Special Eurobarometer 372: Climate Change
Report, 5 (Oct. 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.

47:2

Insurance and Climate Change

741

number one problem. 106 While this is a somewhat different
question than belief in climate change, it necessarily assumes a
high level of public acceptance. A similar poll in the U.S. placed
climate change as eleventh out of thirteen issues upon which
Congress and the president should focus. 107
The political sensitivity of the climate change debate in the
U.S. is also illustrated by how state insurance regulators address
the issue. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC), a private organization composed of the insurance
regulators of all fifty states and six districts and territories, 108 has
had a climate change and global warming working group since
2006. 109 In 2009, the NAIC approved a mandatory climate risk
disclosure survey that each state would administer, but faced with
strong opposition, it reversed itself a year later and made it
voluntary. The NAIC further qualifies this optional survey:
This survey, and the questions contained herein, do not endorse,
reject or otherwise express an opinion on the existence or absence of
climate change. Further, this survey, and the questions contained
herein, do not express an opinion regarding scientific confirmation
or refutation of the existence or absence of climate change. 110

Fortunately, California, New York and Washington, and
recently Connecticut and Minnesota, require insurers writing
more than $100 million in annual premium to complete the
106. Id. “Poverty, hunger and lack of drinking water” was ranked the
greatest problem, followed by “climate change,” “the economic situation,” and
“international terrorism.” Id.
107. YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION & GEORGE
MASON UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION, Public
Support for Climate and Energy Policies in November 2013, 8 (2013), available
at http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/article/public-supportclimate-energy-policies-November-2013. The survey stated, “Here are some
issues now being discussed in Washington D.C. Do you think each of these
issues should be a low, medium, high, or very high priority for the president
and Congress,” where 14% of respondents said global warming should be a
“very high priority” and 13% “high.” Id.
108. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 625 (1999) (describing that, while the NAIC is a private entity without
formal regulatory authority, given the absence of any significant federal regulatory
oversight of the insurance industry, it has long served as the major national forum
for insurance regulatory issues). Its work includes developing model laws,
regulations and regulatory bulletins, which states may enact, and issuing reports
and studies on insurance regulatory and industry issues. Id. Much of the NAIC’s
substantive work is done through its numerous committees and working groups
consisting of state insurance commissioners and their senior staff, supported by
NAIC personnel and its administrative and financial resources. Id.
109. NAIC, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON INSURANCE
REGULATION, 1 (2008), available at www.naic.org/documents/cipr_potential_
impact_climate_change.pdf.
110. NAIC, Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey, 1 (Mar. 28, 2010), available
at www.naic.org/documents/committees_explen_climate_survey_032810.pdf.
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survey, effectively capturing the national market. 111
However, some organizations believe that insurers in the U.S.
are ill prepared and unwilling as of yet to confront climate change
threats. Ceres, the private investor advocacy group that
encourages and promotes environmentalism in major public
companies, has issued several reports over the last four years
criticizing insurers for their lack of discussion on climate change
and lobbied the NAIC on this issue. Ceres has characterized this
silence or indifference as a potential failure in corporate
governance, given how insurers are exposed to climate changes
risks as investors, employers and as risk underwriters. In 2011
Ceres commented, “Yet despite widespread recognition of the
effects climate change will likely have on extreme events, few
insurers were able to articulate a coherent plan to manage the
risks and opportunities associated with climate change.” 112 Ceres
found little improvement by March 2013:
In general, almost all companies responding to the survey show
significant weakness in their preparedness to address the effects of
climate change may have on their business. However a small subset
of industry leaders are evolving their business strategies to remain
competitive as the impacts of climate change unfold. 113

Our state-based insurance regulatory system makes a
national response to concerns raised by Ceres, other organizations,
or the states themselves, more difficult to coordinate. For example,
the NAIC, which exists in part to promote regulatory consistency
(and expertise), could not achieve consensus on even a climate
change survey for insurers. State regulators have concerns similar
to industry about publicly addressing climate change and they
operate in a more politically charged environment, regardless of
whether they are appointed or elected. However, our insurance
regulatory structure is probably a far less significant impediment
to developing a national strategy on climate change than the lack
of public acceptance, multiplicity of building codes and land use
laws, and often uncoordinated, underfunded and inconsistent
federal responses. Further, the federal government does not lack
the authority to require regulatory action or consistency in
111. For a succinct history of the NAIC climate disclosure survey, see CERES,
Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey: 2012 Findings & Recommendations,
15-16 (Mar. 2013), available at www.ceres.org/resources/reports/naic-report/view.
“Despite rising concerns over the financial risks facing the insurance industry
from climate change, climate risk disclosure efforts at the [NAIC] have been
almost as volatile as recent weather.” Id. at 15. Insurer survey responses are
public and available on the California Department of Insurance website.
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news
/0100-press-releases/release108-13.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
112. Supra note 98, CERES, Climate Risk Disclosures by Insurers (Sept.
2011), available at www.ceres.org/resources/reports/insurance.
113. CERES, Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey, p. 6 (Mar. 2013),
available at www.ceres.org/resources/reports/naic-report/view.
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insurance, they simply do not use it often. 114
We do not have a national consensus on how to recognize and
spread the cost of catastrophic risks that affect regions of the
country unequally. 115 And, while insurance can be a powerful tool
to allocate these risks and provide private sector incentives
encouraging mitigation and adaptation to the effects of climate
change, utilizing it requires regulatory consent, whether state, or
federal, on how to do so. Allowing insurers to utilize fully riskbased pricing places much of the risk of loss onto the property
owner (policyholder). Suppressing rates or developing governmentbacked insurance pools spreads the risks and costs to a larger base
of policyholders and taxpayers. This can alleviate some of the
access and affordability concerns but also reduces the incentives to
build better or elsewhere. 116
Often a “consensus” is implicit. For example, the NFIP was not
designed to assess through premiums the full cost of flooding, which
means claims would be partially paid by taxpayers throughout the
country, regardless of their flood exposure. 117 Similarly, government
assistance to rebuild properties after a catastrophic event could be
an appropriate public policy, but it can also reduce the incentives for
property owners to purchase insurance.
Recent amendments to the NFIP capture this debate. In 2012
Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Act, which would have largely
eliminated these subsidies, shifting the risk allocation more to the
individual policyholder and away from the country as a whole. 118
When the magnitude of the rate increases became more widely
known in 2013, a lengthy political debate occurred, which was
frequently captured on the front pages of major newspapers. As a
consequence, in March 2014 Congress passed and the president
signed the Homeowners Flood Insurance Affordability Act of
2014. 119 This Act postpones, revises or repeals the various premium
increases Biggert-Waters required and as a result, our implicit
system of national subsidization of flood losses will continue.
IV. CONCLUSION
This is a pivotal time in the intersection of climate policy,
climate law, and insurance. The regulatory and legal response to
114. See supra note 47. The NFIP is one notable exception, which may prove
the point about problems with federal responses to date.
115. CORNEL QUINTO, INSURANCE SYSTEMS IN TIMES OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
INSURANCE OF BUILDINGS AGAINST NATURAL HAZARDS, 74-75 (Springer, 2010).
116. And perhaps reduces insurers’ willingness to participate in the market.
117. The NFIP is approximately $30 billion in debt, stemming from the 2005
hurricanes and Storm Sandy.
118. Supra note 68.
119. House Resolution 3370, enacted as Public Law No.113-89. Summaries
for this Act can be found through THOMAS, the Library of Congress’ legislative
research engine, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php.
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climate emissions is even more channeled to the CAA. While
climate science has a long history, the real-world impact and
disruption of climate change is very much an evolving question.
New understandings of climate harm yield new challenges for the
insurance industry.
Insurers, at least publicly, are dealing with this uncertain
environment in a spectrum that runs from direct engagement to,
perhaps, complete avoidance. However, avoidance or inaction for
whatever reasons could have dire consequences. Insurance is
based on a portfolio of risk assessment, pricing, spreading, and
when thought necessary, avoidance. Climate change challenges
these functions because the science is uncertain, mitigation and
adaptation responses often largely outside insurer control, and
regulatory responses inconsistent—and without any immediate
promise of uniformity. Litigation risk, whether from claims
against policyholders or insurers directly (e.g., failure of corporate
governance) adds additional uncertainty. This can lead to less,
rather than more, insurer engagement with climate change, as a
logical reaction is to add exclusions and reduce exposure to
property losses and liability claims. But, reducing insurance
coverage would only shift the risks from insurers to policyholders
without any reduction in the magnitude of risk, and lessen the
ability to utilize risk-based premiums as a tool to encourage
mitigation and adaptation.
For now, perhaps the best regulatory solution is to follow the
lead of the state regulators who are actively engaged in climate
change legislation and insist on greater climate information,
study, and portfolio risk evaluation. Providing incentives or
encouraging insurers to engage in the climate change debate in
the U.S. could also contribute to greater acceptance of the reality
of climate change and enhance the ability to develop and
implement more effective responses. 120
Traditional insurance functions—compensating for losses and
providing financial incentives for safety, risk avoidance and
mitigation—make it a valuable ally in adapting to climate change,
but only if it perceives the possibility of profitably insuring the
risks. The legislative and regulatory challenge is to balance these
concerns with equally important questions of insurance access,
affordability, and ultimately the development of a public consensus
of how risks should be socialized throughout a state or the nation.

120. If deciding not to engage in climate change planning is considered a
corporate governance failure, there will also be financial penalties when this
inaction leads to corporate litigation against the insurer and its officers and
directors.

